Mass Nouns, Count Nouns and Non-Count Laycock – – In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. A crucial part of Taurek’s argument is his contention that i. John M. Taurek, ” Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 4. (Summer I ). Oxford University Press USA publishes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, children’s books, business books, dictionaries, reference.
|Published (Last):||6 May 2015|
|PDF File Size:||14.94 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||15.46 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research The well-being of x and y are equal in comparison prior to any intervention by S.
Abstracts should make clear what the linked material is about and what its thesis is. Finally, I draw upon the redeemable 4 In support of a notion of the separateness of persons, see Nagelp. Save the greater number because consequentialism aims to produce the best state of affairs and, other things being equal, more aggregate lives saved may be a better state of affairs than fewer lives saved.
The moral importance of selecting people shluld. Log in or sign up in seconds. For, in order to escape the inconsistent choices, the numbers do need to count. Become a Redditor and subscribe to one of thousands of communities.
Thr will assume henceforth that any true moral principle with respect to the complete prevention of a harm in a Taurek Scenario is likewise true, mutatis mutandis, with respect to the mitigation of a harm in a Taurek Scenario.
Taurek, numbers, and probabilities.
John M. Taurek, Should the numbers count? – PhilPapers
Anarchy, State and Utopia. Links to Google Translated versions of posts are not allowed. No keywords specified fix it. There are four persons that are afflicted by a disease that has paralyzed all of their limbs, and they would all benefit from these pills. So, since Star Wars is not an instance of a Taurek Scenario, Numbers Partly Count is silent about whether or not one should prefer iv over i. In fact, someone who holds the view that persons are incommensurable may not even need to toss a coin.
The sort of chance procedure in mind is something like the following: If so, and if the Separateness of Persons Objection relies on PAI, then one taurei also dismiss the objection on this basis. Oxford University Press,for discussions of these paradoxes of transitivity.
Rather, I am claiming that from this perspective, it is hard to see why substitution and the like would be permitted, but not aggregation. Call this the Broken Finger Objection. If so, they would in effect be embracing the Taurekean position that numbers do not count. The Standard Picture solves the Number Problem because it holds a plausible account of the separateness of persons.
If Yoda does nothing, all four Jedi will suffer excruciatingly to degree 10n. While this paper touches on the moral status of the conference of a benefit in this limited sense of the term, I will not be concerned with moral principles concerning the conference of a benefit where that benefit does not consist in either the prevention of a potential harm or the prevention of a persisting harm that one has already been enduring. Indeed, as noted earlier, Taurek does not say that one must toss a coin.
Rather, S simply ought to choose to save the greater number.
Additionally, nothing that I will claim depends upon these notions being non-vague. And when doing so, the gate towards infinite regression is then opened. It could be argued that someone who believes in the separateness of persons would not allow Premise 4, that one can substitute A with B. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9: In iv A suffers to degree 10n and Secura does not suffer at all. I think that Otsuka can establish this conclusion, but not by way of how he presents the argument.
If one of the other Jedi is chosen, they receive only one pill since the results are the same in comparison the chosen individual only suffers to degree n.
This response of course raises the question of how advocates of the Standard Picture would prioritize numbers versus these other values.
At the same time, a world in which A survives and B dies seems just as bad as a world in which A dies and B survives.
Don’t Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting | Yishai Cohen –
This suggests that the Kamm-Scanlon Argument still involves covertly combining the claims of B and C. So, there is no good reason to think that there cannot be scenarios in which one harm is greater than numvers by a significant degree, and yet both harms are serious in absolute terms.
Contractualism on saving the many. Other things being equal, it seems that we should save B instead of A.
S can prevent a harm for x or for y, but not for both. However, even many non- consequentialists think that numbers skepticism goes too far in rejecting the claim that you ought to save the greater number. Or, it might seem that they must embrace aggregation and thereby whole-sale consequentialism.